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In-packet Bloom filters allow one to forward source-routed packets with minimal forwarding 
tables, the Bloom filter encoding the identities of the links the packet needs to be forwarded 
over. If the link identities are made content dependent, e.g. by computing the next-hop 
candidate link identifiers by applying a cryptographic function over some information carried 
in the packet header, the Bloom filters differ pseudo-randomly from packet-to-packet, making 
the forwarding fabric resistant towards unauthorized traffic. 
The implementation and testing of in-packet bloom filter forwarding node that uses 
cryptographically computed link identifiers are discussed in this thesis. Two different 
cryptographic techniques are tested for the link-identity computation and thereby for making 
the forwarding decision. The algorithms have been implemented and tested on the Stanford 
NetFPGA. The performance and efficiency of the algorithms is also briefly discussed. 
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1  
INTRODUCTION 
 
While Bloom filters [19] are commonly used in several roles in networking 
applications [20], in-packet Bloom filters have only recently gained more 
attention [1][22]. The basic idea in these works is to encode the packet path (or a 
multicast tree) into a small Bloom filter, carried in the packet header. In the 
approach by Jokela et al. [1], each network link was expected to have been 
assigned a statistically unique, unidirectional link identifier. A set of these link 
identifiers, forming the path or the tree, was then encoded into the in-packet 
Bloom filter. This basic method was implemented on the NetFPGA by Keinanen 
et al. [18] 
In a follow up paper, Esteve, Jokela, et al. [21] introduced an idea where the link 
identifiers computed dynamically. That is, instead of storing the names (or Bloom 
masks) of the outgoing links at a forwarding table, the forwarding node would 
dynamically compute the outgoing link identifiers. If the computation uses some 
information from the packet, the link identifiers, and thereby the in-packet Bloom 
filters, may be made flow or packet contents dependent. As a consequence, only 
authorized users, which have the required input parameters for sending packets 
along a specific path, are able to compute the appropriate in-packet Bloom filters 
for any given path. Hence, the method very effectively blocks unauthorized 
traffic, at the cost of parameter distribution. Gathering the input parameters for a 
source route and fast rerouting are out of scope for this thesis. 
From the security point of view, the in-packet Bloom filters act simultaneously as 
forwarding identifiers and forwarding capabilities [21]; introducing a DoS 
resistant forwarding service. Capabilities enable secure statements attached to 
packets, allowing forwarding nodes to easily check if a packet has been approved 
2 
 
by the receiver. Any sender that has the appropriate input parameters is able to 
compute the in-packet Bloom filter, encoding a number of dynamically computed 
link identifiers. When such a packet then arrives at a forwarding node, the node 
computes a number of candidate Bloom masks (i.e. link identifiers), using a 
loosely synchronized time-based shared secret and additional in-packet per-flow 
or per-packet information. The forwarding capabilities are thus expiable and 
packet or flow dependent. They do not require any per-flow network state or 
memory look-ups, at the cost the additional per-packet computation. 
While expected to be secure, the performance of the dynamic-link-identifiers-
based forwarding method needs to be checked in real hardware. The delay and 
the resource usage in the forwarding node need to be examined. In this thesis, we 
present our results from implementing the dynamic-link-identifiers-based 
forwarding method on the NetFPGA, and report our early results on its 
applicability and performance.  
The rest of the thesis is organized as follows: 
Chapter 2, background, where publisher/subscriber based internetworking is 
discussed. Its types, architecture, forwarding mechanism on the basis of bloom 
filters are covered here. It is followed by introduction to Stanford NetFPGA, its 
specifications and reference pipeline. 
Chapter 3 discusses the encryption techniques that include Advanced Encryption 
Standard, Hash based Message Authentication Code and self-synchronizing 
stream ciphers. In particular “Moustique” is discussed for self-synchronizing 
stream ciphers. 
Chapter 4 covers the design part. Secure in-packet bloom filter’s architecture and 
construction is discussed. It is explained using the network example and flow 
diagrams. 
In Chapter 5, the implementation details of the design are discussed. NetFGPA’s 
reference model’s implementation and its modification for our design are 
discussed. It also includes forwarding node’s implementation details. 
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Chapter 6 discusses the testing, evaluation and performance results. Different 
testing and verification cases are presented. Their result evaluation and 
performance comparison is also part of this chapter.  
Chapter 7 concludes the thesis.  
The idea is also presented in a paper “Secure in-packet bloom filter forwarding 
on a NetFPGA” authored by myself, Adnan Hassan Ghani and Pekka Nikander in 
the proceedings of 1st European NetFPGA Developers Workshop, University of 
Cambridge, Computer Laboratory, Cambridge, UK, Sep. 9–10th, 2010. [27] 
Chapter 4, 5 and 6 are based on our paper. 
zFormation’s NetFPGA wikipage is also written by me and can be found at [26]. 
The tests presented in Chapter 6 are also discussed at [26]. 
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2  
BACKGROUND 
 
This chapter covers the basic concepts of Publish/Subscribe based 
internetworking. Its types, architecture and forwarding mechanism are discussed 
in details. Later comes description of Stanford NetFPGA platform. Its 
specifications and reference pipelines are also mentioned. 
2.1 Publish/Subscribe Internetworking 
Publish/Subscribe communication paradigm has got a lot of attention in the last 
few years for distributing information in the wide area networks. The two main 
components in this system are publishers and subscribers. Publishers submit 
information to the system and subscribers express interest in specific types of 
information [1]. The characteristics of this paradigm are that the communication 
is decoupled in space, time and flow. Decoupled in space, time and flow means 
Publisher and Subscriber do not need to know each other, do not to be up at the 
same time and sending/receiving does not block the participants.  
The main schemes in which publish/subscribe systems can be divided are as 
follows: 
1. Topic-based Publish/Subscribe 
2. Content-based Publish/Subscribe 
2.1.1 Topic-based Publish/Subscribe 
In a topic-based system, the subscriber expresses interest to specific topics and 
receives the events related to those particular topics. These topics correspond to a 
separate logical channel that connects each publisher to all interested subscribers. 
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Some systems that come in this model are COBRA Notification Service [2], 
Bayeux [3] , SCRIBE [4] and iBus [5].  
2.1.2 Content-based Publish/Subscribe 
In a content-based system, messages are only delivered to a subscriber if the 
attributes or contents of those messages match constraints defined by the 
subscriber. It can be defined also as, a filter is defined over the attributes of the 
notification. The subscriber is responsible for classifying the messages. Some of 
the systems that come in this model are SIENA [6], LeSubscribe [7], Ready [8] 
and Gryphon [9]. 
2.1.3 Architecture 
The architecture presented in “LIPSIN: Line Speed Publish/Subscribe 
internetworking” [1]  is defined here as my work is based on the same 
architecture.  
The Publish/Subscribe architecture can be defined in a layered and recursive 
approach. The higher layers are utilizing the lower layers’ rendezvous, topology 
and forwarding functions. At the bottom of the whole architecture lies the 
“Forwarding or more” shown in Figure 1.  
There are two parts of the structure. One is data and the other is control plane. In 
the control plane, the information about the whole network structure is with the 
topology system. It creates and spreads this information within the network. Next 
to topology system is Rendezvous system. It lies on top of the topology system. It 
deals with the matching between the publishers and subscribers. When there is a 
publication and it has some subscribers, a request from rendezvous system is sent 
to the topology system to build a logical forwarding tree. This forwarding tree is 
basically the path from the current location to the subscriber. It also shares the 
information about the forwarding with the publisher. [1] 
The data plane is responsible for forwarding functionality. It also deals with the 
transport functions including error detection and traffic scheduling. [1] Some 
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other functions are also involved i.e. opportunistic caching and lateral error 
correction but these are out of scope. Our main focus will be on forwarding layer. 
 
Figure 1. Rendezvous, Topology and Forwarding [1] 
2.1.4 Recursive bootstrapping 
Bootstrapping is done to invoke the initial connectivity in the network. For this, 
the rendezvous and topology systems are bootstrapped. It takes place from the 
lower layer towards the upper layers. At the lower layer, the connectivity takes 
place from any node towards the rendezvous system in the pub/sub network. The 
lower layer provides the information to the topology management functions. 
They exchange information about the connectivity similar to the other routing 
protocols. Hence, a network graph is mapped. Similar procedure occurs for the 
rendezvous system to advertise themselves. [1] 
2.1.5 Forwarding on Bloom link identifiers 
According to LIPSIN [1], the links are identified instead of nodes. This means 
instead of giving names to the nodes, the links are given names. Forwarding takes 
place on the basis of Bloom-filter-based approach. The forwarding identifiers are 
created by encoding the link identifiers by the topology system. It also creates 
new states at the forwarding nodes if required.  
As a simple case, consider a point to point case, where two nodes are connected 
with a single bi-directional link. This link will have two separate identifiers, each 
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identifying the specific direction of packet flow. When the same case is mapped 
to multi-point scenario, statistically unique identifiers are assigned to all of the 
links. 
When the link identifiers are encoded into a Bloom filters, they first need to be 
converted into a Bloom mask. The standard way for that is to compute k distinct 
hash functions over the identifier, defining k bit positions that are then set to 1 in 
the Bloom mask. However, for the simplicity of handling, for the most part we 
ignore this step and consider the link identifiers to be in the Bloom mask form 
already from the beginning. 
Hence, for a (k,m) Bloom filter scheme, the length of each link identifier (Bloom 
mask) is m-bit, in which k bits are set to 1, with k << m. For example, if m = 256 
and k = 5, the number of unique link identifiers ≈ m!/(m − k)!k! ≈ 1010.  
 
Figure 2. Example of Link IDs assigned for links, as well as publication with a zFilter, built for 
forwarding the packet from the Publisher to the Subscriber [1]. 
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As in [9], we further assume a topology system which keeps track of forwarding 
nodes in the network and the identifiers of the links interconnecting the nodes. 
The system also keeps track of the potential senders and receivers in the network. 
Using this information, the topology system may create a graph representation of 
the network, with the edges annotated with the link identifiers. This can then be 
used when packets need to be forwarded from a sender to a receiver (or group of 
receivers). 
In [1], the topology system encodes the link identifiers along a path (or a tree) 
into a Bloom filter, and then gives the Bloom filter to the source node, which then 
places it into the packets; see Figure 2. In their work, Jokela et al. denote the in-
packet Bloom filter as a zFilter.  
When a packet reaches a forwarding node along the path, each candidate 
outgoing link identifier (Bloom mask) is ANDed with the zFilter carried in the 
packet, and the result is compared with the link identifier. If there is a match, the 
packet is forwarded along the path; conversely, if there is no match, the packet is 
not forwarded along the link associated with that particular candidate outgoing 
link identifier. Furthermore, if there are matches with multiple candidate 
identifiers, the packet is by default forwarded along all of the matching links, 
thereby providing support for multicast; see Algorithm 1. 
Input: Link IDs of the outgoing links; 
 zFilter in the packet header 
foreach  Link ID of outgoing interface do 
  if  zFilter & Link ID == Link ID then 
   Forward packet on the link 
  end 
end 
 
Algorithm 1. Forwarding method of LIPSIN [1]. 
As usually with Bloom filters, with the increase in the number of links encoded 
into a zFilter, there arises a possibility of false positives. While the Link ID Tag 
mechanism, introduced in [1], may be used to squeeze in some more link 
identifiers without causing too many or too bad false positives, the number of 
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links within a zFilter has always a practical upper bound that depends on m, the 
length of the zFilter.  
2.1.6 Forwarding in TCP/IP based networks 
In case of IP, LIPSIN can be considered as another underlying forwarding fabric 
like Ethernet and MPLS. Upon the arrival of the IP packet into the LIPSIN fabric, 
a header with a zFilter is appended in the start at the entering node. It is then 
removed at the leaving node. In case of unicast traffic, a pre-computed zFilter 
specifies the specific leaving node and packet is forwarded on that path. For 
multicast, the entering router of the source needs to keep track of the joins 
received on multicast group through the edge routers. Hence, it also knows the 
leaving edges where the packet should be forwarded. Having this information a 
zFilter can be constructed for suitable links. [1] 
2.1.7  Link IDs and LITs 
To reduce the false positives, Link ID Tags (LITs) are introduced in addition to 
Link IDs. A signle Link ID is replaced with  d distinct LITs that is shown in 
Figure 3. Hence, different candidate zFilters can be constructed and one best can 
be selected among them in terms of optimized for false positive rate, compliance 
with network policies and false positive rate. [18] 
It gives birth to d forwarding tables. Each table contains LIT entries for active 
Link IDs. An index in the packet header determines which forwarding table 
should be used to perform matching as shown in Figure 4. Its construction is 
similar to single Link ID. The only difference is d distinct candidate filters are 
calculated. They have equivalent representation of delivery tree. By this way the 
false forwarding number is minimized. [18] 
 
 
Figure 3. One Link ID to d distint LITs [1] 
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From security point of view, this basic mechanism is susceptible to a number of 
attacks. For example, an attacker may try to collect zFilters and guess a 
forwarding identiﬁer based upon such collected information. That is, by analysis 
of zFilter bit patterns, an attacker may determine the probabilities of what bits are 
set to one on which partial graph. With having a large number of zFilters, source 
and sinks’ information, an attacker may have success in constructing a valid 
zFilter. 
In this thesis we explore some solutions to this security problem and evaluate 
their performance penalty. The design is discussed in Chapter 4. 
2.2 The Stanford NetFPGA Platform 
The NetFPGA is an open source hardware platform through which students and 
researchers are able to build networking systems. They run on line-rate. It enables 
to build reusable designs [12]. 
The NetFPGA’s existence came at Stanford University where the first version 
with 10Mb/s Ethernet was designed in 2001. In 2005-2006, the second version 
Figure 4. Outgoing interfaces equipped with d forwarding tables, indexed by value in 
pakcet header [1] 
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with 1Gb/s was developed. Its working version came into existence in 2007 that 
was tested by the users of ten universities. With the support of industry like 
Cisco, Google, Huawei, Juniper, Agilent, Micron, Cypress and Broadcom the 
beta program started in the start of 2008. The cards were built and launched 
through Digilent Inc. The open-source gateware, software and hardware were 
made available on the website.  At the moment around 1000 NetFPGA boards are 
available at around 150 universities and research institutions in different parts of 
the world.  
2.2.1 Specifications 
The NetFPGA platform contains one Xilinx Virtex-II Pro 50 FPGA alongwith a 
Xilinx Spartan FPGA. Former is programmed with user-defined logic while the 
latter is used to program the former and takes care of PCI interface as well. It 
contains two Static RAMs (SRAMs) and two Double Data Rate (DDR2) SDRAM 
Devices. SRAM operates synchronously and SDRAM operates asynchronously 
with the NetFPGA. It also contains a quad-port physical layer transceiver (PHY). 
Using these, NetFPGA can send and receive packets as it provides interface to 
four twisted-pair Ethernet cables. Two Serial ATA (SATA) enable multiple 
NetFPGAs to to exchange data at high speed in the platform. Figure 5 shows the 
NetFPGA.  [12] 
The NetFPGA library includes a verilog design that instantiates four Gigabit 
Ethernet Media Access Controllers (GMACs). It also interfaces the logic to 
SRAM and DDR2 memory. The modules inside use First-in-First-Out (FIFO) 
protocol. The circuit is implemented into the FPGA using standard Computer 
Aided Design tools. The simulation is run using Mentor Graphics ModelSim tool. 
It is synthesized using Xilinx ISE tools. The PCI interface enables to program the 
Virtex NetFPGA. [11] 
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Figure 5. Photo of a NetFPGA [11] 
The NetFPGA release can be divided into three main components. The first one 
is the kernel module. It is used to communicate with the NetFPGA hardware. The 
bitfiles to program FPGA through PCI interface, communicating with the register 
interface from software is all done through kernel module. Second is the utility 
software that includes read and write programs. The third one is the reference 
pipeline. These all can be seen in the Figure 6. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6. Detailed specifications of NetFPGA [13] 
2.2.2 Reference Pipeline 
Different sources of packet arrival into the NetFPGA are: i) four network 
interfaces through Gigabit Ethernet, ii) the host CPU through PCI interface and 
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iii) other NetFPGAs those are connected by Multi-Gigabit Transceivers (MGT) 
via SATA connectors. On arrival into the module, the required operations are 
performed according to user logic. Then an output port lookup module places the 
packet into the required output queue on which it is meant to be forwarded.   
Two buses interconnect the Modules in the pipeline. Those are the packet bus and 
the register bus.  
The 64-bit packet bus sends data from one module to the other. The packet is 
divided into 64-bit words and sent in series between the modules. The part or 
whole of a packet can be stored into the FIFOs in each module if required to do 
some processing. The sum of clocks to process and stream the packet in each 
module gives us total latency. The register bus can be used by the software to 
change the hardware registers. ioctl calls can be used to access the registers from 
software and they appear to I/O registers to software. The registers are connected 
in a chain style and accessible from each module.   Figure 7 shows the pipeline 
structure. 
Figure 7. Reference pipeline [12] 
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3  
ENCRYPTION TECHNIQUES 
_________________________________________________________________ 
In this chapter the encryption techniques are discussed. The chapter starts with 
detailed description of block cipher Advanced Encryption Standard (AES). Next 
comes Hash-based Message authentication using secure Hash Algorithm 
(HMAC-SHA). Finally, Self-synchronizing stream ciphers are discussed. In 
particular a single bit stream cipher Moustique is described with its architecture 
and construction. 
3.1 Advanced Encryption standard 
Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) also known as Rijndael (named after its 
Belgian co-inventors Joan Daemen and Vincent Rijmen) is symmetric-key 
encryption standard. It was announced by National institute of Standards and 
Technology (NIST). 
It is based upon the properties of finite field of 256 elements. Each byte can be 
associated with a unique element of this field. As the field elements can be 
multiplied and added, this association makes it possible to add and multiply 
bytes. Similarly, each byte has a multiplicative inverse in a field. Due to all these 
properties, it’s possible to encode entire bytes using nonlinear matrix operations 
at a time [14]. 
AES uses a fixed block size of 128 bits and a key size of 128, 196 or 256 bits. 
Here we will discuss only the case where key size is 128 bits. It comprises of 
several transformation rounds to perform diffusion of the bits. Particularly for our 
case it’s ten rounds. Hence, a 16 bytes plaintext is converted into 16 bytes 
ciphertext by going through ten rounds of transformations where each round has 
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its own derived key from the original key. It operates on 4x4 array of bytes that is 
known as state. 
3.1.1 Overview of the algorithm 
1. Key expansion The W-matrix is computed from the key. The first four 
columns of the original keyword matrix is added to the input data 
consisting of 16 bytes arranged in a 4x4 matrix. 
2. Nine Rounds of transformations 
i. ByteSub (BS) According to a lookup table each byte is replaced 
with another byte. 
ii. ShiftRows (SR) Each row is shifted cyclically a certain number of 
steps.  
iii. MixColumns (MC) Columns of the state are mixed in a special 
order.  
iv. AddRoundKey (ARK) 
3. Final round (MC is not applied in this round) 
i. ByteSub 
ii. ShiftRows 
iii. AddRoundKey 
Now we'll explain the above steps in detail Using S-Box for the code The S-Box 
for the AES code is given by the 16x16 matrix. 
The S-box is used to replace a byte with a coded byte. It is done as if the input 
byte is (C7C6…C0), then the number in row     
    
    and in column      
  
    
of S-box is the integer representation of the new byte. For example, input byte is 
10101100, then the row is first four bits 1010 = 10 (in integer) and column is last 
four bits 1100 = 12. So the corresponding number from the above matrix is 145 = 
10010001. [14] 
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S-Box 
Representing input data 
As input is 16 bytes (128 bits) then they can be arranged into 4x4 matrix in 
following order 
 
ByteSub Transformation 
The ByteSub Transformation is non-linear and hence, resistant to both linear and 
differential attacks. In this step each byte in A is replaced using the S-Box 
according to the procedure stated above and the new Matrix can be represented as 
follows 
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The ShiftRow Transformation 
This linear transformation causes diffusion of the bits. Row j of the matrix is 
shifted cyclically to the left by j offsets so the new matrix is of the form 
 
The MixColumn Transformation 
 
This transformation causes strong diffusion where each byte in matrix C is 
represented as elements of F256 and multiplied by matrix M 
 
 
For example the first column of the matrix C is of the form 
 
Then the first in the left uppermost position of MC will be computed as:      
                                                
                 
RoundKey Addition  
Round key addition is the modulo2 addition (XOR) of MC with the Round Key at 
the end of j
th
 round. Round Key is obtained by means of key schedule. Key 
schedule can be explained by considering a W-Matrix. The initial key of 16 bytes 
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are placed in first four columns of W-Matrix which is 4 x 44. The other columns 
of W-matrix are generated from first four columns in following manner. As we 
will start computing from the fifth column then say     and column     is   . 
If j is not a multiple of 4, then  
                   
where addition is modulo 2. If j is multiple of 4 then following steps should be 
followed 
1) Replace every byte in column       with a byte from S-Box using 
ByteSub Transformation. 
2) A vector      is created by moving the top byte to the bottom and every 
other byte one place up in the matrix obtained in step 1. 
3) The new column matrix   is computed as 
                     
Where    can be given as 
 
3.2 HMAC-SHA-256 
Hash-based Message authentication code (HMAC) is used for the calculation of 
a message authentication code (MAC) on the basis of a cryptographic hash 
function with a secret key. MAC has the capability to check both the data 
integrity and authenticity of the message. Different hash functions like MD5, 
SHA-1, SHA-2, etc. can be used to compute HMAC and hence the resulting 
algorithm is known as HMAC-MD5, HMAC-SHA-1, HMAC-SHA-2, etc. Its 
strength depends upon the hash function used, hash output length and the secret 
key. HMAC can be mathematically defined as  
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where H() is the hashing function that we will discuss later on. K is the secret 
key, m is the message,   is concatenation. opad is the outer padding constant and 
its value is 0x5c times blocksize while ipad is inner padding with value 0x36 
times block size. [15] 
Secure Hash Algorithm (SHA) 
SHA-0, SHA-1 and SHA-2 are the set of cryptographic hash functions. They are 
designed by National Secuity Agency (NSA) and published by NIST. SHA-1 
avoids some weaknesses from SHA-0 by correcting an error otherwise they are 
quite similar. SHA-2 is quite different and stronger than the both. SHA-2 consists 
of four hash functions on the basis of different digest sizes i.e. 224, 256, 384 and 
512. Table 1 below gives the comparison between the different SHA functions. 
These were calculated on a Intel Core 2.18 GHz under 32-bit Vista. [15] The 
pseudo code for SHA-256 can be found in Appendix A.  
Algorithm 
And Variant 
Output 
size 
(bits) 
Internal 
state 
size 
(bits) 
Block 
size 
(bits) 
Max 
message 
size 
(bits) 
Word 
size 
(bits) 
Rounds Operations 
Collisions 
found 
SHA-0 160 160 512 264-1 32 80 +,and,or,xor,rot Yes 
SHA-1 160 160 512 264-1 32 80 +,and,or,xor,rot 
Theoratical 
attack (251) 
SHA-
2 
SHA-
256/224 
256/224 256 512 264-1 32 80 +,and,or,xor,shr,rot None 
SHA-
512/384 
512/384 512 1024 2128-1 64 80 +,and,or,xor,shr,rot None 
 
Table 1. Performance Comparison of SHA functions [15] 
 
SHA-256 and SHA-512 are novel hash functions. SHA-256 is computed with 32 
bit words while SHA-512 is computed with 64 bits words. The number of rounds, 
shift amounts and additive constants for the computation differ but still the 
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structure is similar. SHA-224 and SHA-384 use different initial values from the 
first two and can be simply seen as their truncated versions.  
3.3 Self-synchronizing stream cipher 
A stream cipher or a state cipher performs encryption on a plaintext bits with a 
pseudorandom cipher bit stream by an exclusive-or (XOR) operation. The 
plaintext bits are encrypted one at a time. During the encryption process, the 
successive bits get transformed. In self-synchronizing stream cipher, to compute 
the pseudorandom bits i.e. keystream, it uses several of previous N ciphertext 
bits. The idea behind using a self-synchronizing stream cipher is that if the 
synchronization is lost, the state will eventually recover as it is filled up again by 
received bits cipher bits. 
In stream cipher, if m
t 
is the plaintext and z
t
 is the keystream, then the resulting 
ciphertext c
t
 can be given as  [16] 
         
Where  is the exclusive-or. Similarly the decryption can be performed as  
         
The keystream z
t 
is determined by  
          
            
Where last nm ciphertext bits and cipher key K of nk  bits take part in the 
computation of cipher function Fc and determine z
t
. When computing for the first 
time, we don’t have any previous nm ciphertext bits so we need an initialization 
vector that can be given as  
                               
The encryptor and decryptor both should have initialization vector. Figure 8 
shows the block diagram of the encryptor and  decryptor of a self synchronizing 
stream cipher.  
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Figure 8. The self synchronizing stream cipher [16] 
The cipher function architecture can be built using the idea of pipelining and 
conditional complementing shift registers (CCSR). Figure 9 shows different 
stages from bs to Gi with shift registers. The encryption speed has limitation of 
the stages, so the stages should be simple with small propagation delay. [16] 
 
Figure 9. Self synchronizing stream cipher with cipher function consisting of stages [16] 
By replacing the shift register with finite state machine will improve the 
propagation property. If q is the internal state and G the state updating 
transformation then  
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3.3.1 Moustique cipher function 
Now we will explain a single bit self-synchronizing stream cipher and its 
specifications. So we have symbol size ns = 1, key size nk = 96, input memory nm 
= 105. Cipher function delay bs = 9.  
CCSR’s 128 bits are partitioned in 96 cells and denoted by qj where j ranges from 
1 to 96. The number of bits allocated to the cells is dependent upon the value of j 
and denoted by nj given in Table 2 and shown in Figure 10. The bits within the 
cell are denoted by   
 
 with        . Moustique has 8 internal stages denoted 
by a
i
. The first stage is the CCSR and is denoted by a
o 
with length 128. a
1
to
 
a
5 
have length 53. a
6
 has length of 12 and a
7
 has length 3. [17] The encryption and 
decryption using moustique is given is Figure 12. 
Range of j nj 
1 – 88  1 
89 – 92  2 
93 – 94 4 
95 8 
96 16 
Table 2. Number of bits per cell 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 10. CCSR Expansion [17] 
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There are three state updating functions which consist of basic addition and 
multiplication. Those functions are given below and there circuits are shown in 
Figure 11. 
                    
                         
                          
 
Figure 11. State updating functions [17] 
The CCSR bits are calculated using following  
  
                
                 
          
   
with v  , w       The values for x, v and w for all combinations are 
specified in Table 3 except for    , j = 96 and        For     the qv and qw 
are taken to be 0. The 15 bits   
   with      is given by 
  
              
     
            
              
      
 
Table 3. Function, v and w values [17] 
24 
 
 
 
Table 4. Bit updating functions for the stages [17] 
 
Table 4 has the bit updating functions for the stages. In the equations if the index 
is out of bound then 0 should be taken for those values.  
The keystream bit can be given as  
    
    
    
  
So 
         
    
    
   
and  
         
    
    
   
 
Figure 12. Encryption and decryption using moustique [17] 
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4  
DESIGN 
 
In this chapter, we present the detailed architecture of the secure and dynamic 
link-identity-based forwarding approach. In particular, we briefly describe the 
two different cryptographic functions that we have used, one based on a self-
synchronizing stream cipher and the other on the standard AES block cipher. Our 
initial assumption was that using a self-synchronizing stream cipher could allow 
us to perform more parallelized and thereby faster forwarding decisions. That 
assumption turned out to be false, for a number of reasons. Those reasons are 
explained in the coming sections. [27] 
4.1 Secure in-packet Bloom filters 
As described in section 2.1, “the basic mechanism is susceptible to a number of 
attacks. For example, an attacker may try to collect zFilters and guess a 
forwarding identiﬁer based upon such collected information. That is, by analysis 
of zFilter bit patterns, an attacker may determine the probabilities of what bits are 
set to one on which partial graph. With having a large number of zFilters, source 
and sinks’ information, an attacker may have success in constructing a valid 
zFilter”. [27] 
Here we will discuss the solution to this problem with our basic concept of the 
secure in-packet bloom filters and their construction based on [27]. 
Our design dynamically computes the link identifiers on the basis of packet 
contents, the path the packet takes, and the node keys. In the following, we will 
use the term zFormation to designate our design, i.e. basically the dynamic 
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computation of the link identifiers on per- packet basis. The idea is that there is a 
function Z, essentially evaluated for each packet and for each potential outgoing 
interface, which gives out the indices of the k bits set to one in the m-bits long 
link identifier (Bloom mask). 
The function Z can be defined as 
O = Z(K, M,  I) 
where the input parameters of Z are defined as follows: 
1. K is a semi static secret key that is changed periodically, e.g. once every 
few minutes, hours or days. 
2. M is a medium dynamic term that includes the incoming and outgoing 
interface indices. 
3. I denotes some in-packet information that varies per packet, e.g. a counter 
that increases per packet basis. 
As far as the security requirements are concerned, semi static part K needs to be 
very strong i.e. it should be impracticable to predict Bloom Filter by reusing the 
older K values if they get changed.  I can be weak, i.e. the attackers are allowed 
to infer partial information with some controllable probability as long as attacks 
are not trivial. 
For performance purposes, the key K is divided into three cryptographically 
separated parts, K1, K2 and K3 which are created using a standard key derivation 
function (KDF): 
Ki = KDF(K, Li) 
where the term Li is a literal identifying the particular key. 
The Key Derivation Function (KDF) is used to compute the three keys. These 
keys are used in the construction of zFormation in the following manner: 
O1 = F1(K1 , S) 
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where S denotes any (semi-)static inputs to the function. 
O2 = F2(K2 , O1 || M) 
where || denotes concatenation. Furthermore, if there are multiple potential 
actively valid values for M, it may be necessary to pre-compute and cache a set of 
corresponding O2 values. We call such a set of O2 values as O2 value set. 
O = O3 = F3(K3  , O2   I) 
where  denotes exclusive OR. 
4.2 Reasons for choosing Encryption techniques 
The functions F1 and F2 can be computed off-line, before packet processing, using 
a strong algorithm, e.g. HMAC-SHA-256. The function F3   needs to be performed 
on per-packet bases, and thereby represents a compromise between security and 
performance. We use per-packet information, as an input value to the hash 
function, to make it infeasible to send other packets using an eavesdropped 
Bloom filter. That is, an active attacker may capture some packet and replay them 
a number of times, until one of the node keys is changed, but the attacker cannot 
send modified packets. When combined with per- packet caching or fingerprints, 
this prevents replay-based DoS attacks. [27]  
We consider two constructions, using a self-synchronizing stream cipher and a 
block cipher function. The in-packet information I can be formed, for example, 
by using a packet a counter that is incremented once per-packet, and then taking a 
cryptographic hash over counter, using HMAC-SHA-256. [27] 
The idea behind using a self-synchronizing stream cipher is that if the 
synchronization is lost, the state will eventually recover as it is filled up again by 
received bits. However, in our case we don’t really need this property. [27] 
For us, the important property is to get fast and securely the number of bits that 
we need to determine the k bits needed for forming the outgoing link identifier. 
Self-synchronizing stream ciphers have the nice property that they output bits on 
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just a couple clock cycles after having been fed in the input. Since they usually 
work on single-bit bases, they are fine for line-speed processing. [27] 
Unfortunately, the NetFPGA reference router pipeline processes bits in 64-bits 
words, thereby foiling at the NetFPGA some of the nice properties. To alleviate 
this, we plan to unroll the stream cipher in the future, aiming towards getting 
more than one bits out in a cycle. However, in this work we only report the 
implementation, using the Moustique (see section 3.3.1). The other block cipher 
technique that we have considered is Advanced Encryption Standard AES: see 
section 3.1.  
4.3 Functionality using example 
 
Figure 13. Bloom filter based routing 
 
A concrete example is given to explain the functionality. In relation to Figure 13, 
assume the user A wants to send a packet to the server B through the network. As 
a consequence of this factorization of F, the calculation of O3 can be performed 
by the user A. To facilitate this, the "name server" would provide user A, not with 
the final bloom filter BF, but rather with a set of O2 values which describes the 
path in the network for the particular "session" or "publication" and the key K3. 
The user A would then compute the BF for each packet according to the 
following principle: 
For each O2-value in the set received from "name server" do: 
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Generate information I (could be a random value) 
Compute O = F3(K3, O2-value || I) 
Insert O in BF 
 
User A next inserts the constructed BF and the generated information I in the 
packet and sends it to router R1.  
The router R1 has pre-computed O2 values for each of its outgoing links for each 
of the flows it is aware of. 
Upon receipt of the packet, router R1 computes O3 for each of its links 
(represented by the O2 values in this computation) based on the information I 
received in the packet and checks if O3 is a member of the BF also received in the 
packet. If the O3 value is present in the BF, the router R1 forwards the packet on 
the corresponding link. It is here assumed that R1 can obtain the O2 value from 
the context information C, e.g. the link names as exemplified in Figure 13, and K2 
and K3 from the master key K, shared with the “name server”, by applying the 
KDF function. As an alternative to sharing the master key K with the “name 
server”, the “name server” may distribute the derived keys K1, K2 and K3 to the 
router R1 (and similarly to other routers). 
4.4 Flow of the design 
The example discussed in section 4.3 uses a “name server”. As our main focus is 
on forwarding so we have adopted the design in such a form that the name server 
part is also done by the sender.  
The overall flow of the design is depicted in figures 14 and 15. Figure 14 shows 
the flow at the sender side and Figure 15 shows the flow at the forwarding node 
side. 
At the sender side when sender has data to send, it generates keys K1, K2 and K3. 
The route between sender and the receiver is find out and represented in a form of 
in/out pairs. O1 and O2 are computed using the corresponding keys K1 and K2, 
respectively. K3 and the O2 value set are distributed among the forwarding nodes 
on the path. For each O2 value in the set, sender generates a nonce I and computes 
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Yes 
No 
Yes 
Starts receiving packet 
 
For each value in O2-set compute  
F3(K3,O2-value XOR Nonce)  
Do this in parallel for all  
outgoing links 
 
Is the result of F3 present in zFilter in 
the packet? 
 
Forward packet on that link 
 
Receive set of O2-values and K3 for 
 the session 
 
 
F3. Inserts the result O, in the form of a Bloom mask into the Bloom filter carried 
in the packet. [27] 
At the forwarding node side, it already receives O2 value set and K3. When it 
receives packet, it retrieves the nonce I from the packet and performs F3 for each 
outgoing interface in parallel, giving out the candidate outgoing Bloom mask for 
each outgoing link. Using these Bloom masks as link identifiers, the node then 
implements the “usual” in-packet Bloom filters based forwarding (as described in 
section 2.1.5), to check whether the Bloom mask is present in the Bloom filter or 
not. If present, the packet is forwarded along the path; otherwise it is 
dropped.[27] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 14. Flow diagram of a forwarding node operation 
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No 
Yes 
Generate Key K and derive keys 
 K1, K2 and K3 from K 
 
Find route between sender and 
destination and represent it by a set of 
in/out pairs 
 
Compute O1 = F1(K1,< some semi  
Static data>) 
 
For each link, compute  
O2 = (K2, O1 || link) 
 
For each O2 value in the O2-set, the 
sender 
1. Generates a nonce I 
2. Computes O = F3(K3, O2  
Nonce) 
3. Inserts O into zFilter 
 
Distribute the set of computed 
O2 values and the key K3 to the 
routers along the path 
 
Insert zFilter and nonce into the packet 
 
Send Packet 
 
Sender has data to send 
 
Stop 
Figure 15. Flow diagram of a sender’s operation 
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4.5 Packet Header Format 
The header of the forwarding packet is depicted in Figure 16 in 32 bit format. 
First 14 bytes are MAC layer header followed by forwarding header. The 
forwarding header can be divided into two parts. The first header carries nonce 
and the second one carries bloom filter. The important fields for the header are 
header length, nonce, d, time-to-live (TTL) and BF.  
The length of the header for each part is defined in header length field that is one 
byte long.  
Nonce I, changes per-packet and 256-bits are reserved for this. A counter that is 
encrypted using HMAC-SHA-256 is 256 bits long. 
d defines which of the link ID tags should be used. This was required for the 
previous implementation and is of no use for the current design. 
TTL takes one byte and 3 bytes are reserved for future use. 
BF, can also be referred as forwarding Identifier (FID) takes 256-bits. Payload 
follows the header.  
 
Source Address (6 bytes) 
   
Destination Address (6 bytes)  
Ether Type (2 bytes) NextHeader (1byte) HeaderLength (1byte) 
Nonce (32 bytes) 
NextHeader (1byte) HeaderLength(1byte) d (2 bytes) 
TTL (1 btyes) Reserved (3 bytes) 
BF (32 bytes) 
Figure 16. Forwarding header format 
23 31 15 7 0 
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5  
IMPLEMENTATION 
 
This chapter covers the implementation of the design described in chapter 4. It 
describes how reference implementation of NetFPGA is taken and modified for 
our own design. The detailed implementation description of forwarding node in 
hardware is given. It also briefly covers the software management part. This 
chapter is also discussed in our paper [27]. 
In this work, we have taken the previous implementation of zFilter based 
forwarding node on a NetFPGA [18] and optimized it to our needs of 
implementing zFormation, as explained below. 
The basic forwarding method remains unmodified. The difference here is instead 
of having fixed Link IDs (or link ID Tags (LITs)) we have dynamically computed 
identifiers of the links, on a per-packet basis. The dynamic Link IDs are 
computed using zFormation: see section 4.1. 
 We have two implementations for the computation. One is using the Moustique 
stream cipher and the other one is using AES block cipher. In each case, the Link 
IDs are computed using i) In-packet information (I), ii) a periodically changing 
key (K3) and iii) the outgoing interface index (O2). 
The forwarding decision is simple binary AND and comparison operations, for 
the in-packet Bloom filter and the computed Link ID. The implementation of 
Name Server is out-of-scope for the thesis. Our main and initial emphasis was to 
get a forwarding node working. Its implementation details are as follows. 
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5.1 Forwarding Node 
The adopted implementation utilizes only a limited set of modules from the 
Stanford reference switch, without modifying the rest as shown in Figure 17.   
 
5.1.1 Modified datapath 
The modules that we have used in our implementation from the reference 
implementation and our own designed are only discussed here. In Figure 17 we 
have several queues named as Rx_queues followed by input_arbiter. Module 
output_queues follows input_arbiter and has a sub-module 
output_port_selector. This output_port_selector contains our main 
implementation of zFormation. Finally we have Tx_queues.  
Rx Queues 
These are the queues which receive packets from the IO ports. Those 
ports include Ethernet and PCI over DMA. As can be seen in Figure 17, 
there are total eight receiver queues, four for MAC and four for CPU 
DMA. These queues are interleaved in such a fashion that port 0 is MAC, 
port 1 is CPU, port two is again MAC and port 3 is CPU and so on. These 
 
Output Queues 
Output Port Selector 
Figure 17 Reference datapath [13] on left and modified datapath on right 
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ports are connected to user_data_path which contain rest of the 
modules. [13] 
Input arbiter 
The functionality of input_arbiter is to select the Rx queue from which 
the packets should be taken and then forwarding them to the next module 
in the flow. [13] In the reference design output_port_lookup was the 
next coming module. But in our design, input_arbiter is directly 
connected to output_queues.  
Output_Queues  
Module output_queues has a sub-module output_port_selector. The 
packets come in  output_queues and stored in a RAM until the decision 
to forward on which Tx queue is taken in module 
output_port_selector. The forwarding decision is based on 
zFormation. For computing the dynamic Link IDs, a separate module 
moustique is implemented for the stream cipher, and aes_cipher_top 
for the block cipher. For each link these modules are instantiated in 
parallel from the output_port_selector module. Further details on 
output_port_selector are discussed in section 5.2. 
Tx Queues 
Tx queues send packets out on the IO port received from the 
output_queues.  They have the same alignment as Rx queues i.e. they 
are interleaved in the same fashion. 
5.1.2 Packet bus 
Here we will discuss the signaling details that take place between the pipeline’s 
modules and the registers.  
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The speed at which the 64 bit wide user_data_path is running is 125MHz. This 
means that the maximum bandwidth that could be achieved is 8Gbps. Packets 
arrive at different modules and pushed to the other modules using synchronous 
FIFO like protocol. The signals which are used are write (WR), ready (RDY), 
data (DATA) and control (CTRL). The sizes of these signals are WR one bit, 
RDY one bit, DATA 64 bits and CTRL 8 bits. Let’s assume module j has packet that 
it wants to push forward to next module j+1. When the module j+1 is ready to 
accept data, it asserts the RDY signal. On this module j places the packet on DATA 
bus with required information on CTRL bus and asserts the WR signal. Module j 
accepts the data on this and keeps on receiving data until it deasserts the RDY 
signal. It should be done one clock cycle prior to intentions of not receiving data 
anymore. [23] 
The CTRL bus has two purposes. One is to distinguish between module headers 
and the second is to indicate the last byte of packet. It has non-zero value for 
different headers until it receives the payload. For data part in the packet it goes 
to zero. Finally, when comes the end of the packet, the CTRL bus gets the value of 
the last byte. Hence, giving indication to the end of the packet with last byte in 
the last word. It is shown in Figure 18. The CTRL bus has 0xXX and 0xYY (some 
non-zero) value for different headers until the packet data starts when it get 0x00 
value. The last word has 0x40 that in binary is 0b01000000. This shows the 7 
byte is the last byte in the last word. [13] 
 
Figure 18. General format of the packet passing on the packet bus [23] 
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5.1.3 Register bus 
The register bus is designed in the form of a chained pipeline that gives access to 
the host to change values in their own modules. The 32 bits wide register bus also 
runs at 125MHz. There are two set of signals. One for incoming requests and the 
second for outgoing replies. For incoming requests the registers are: 
REG_REQ_IN, REG_ACK_IN, REG_RD_WR_L_IN, REG_ADDR_IN (23-bits), 
REG_DATA_IN (32-bits), REG_SRC_IN (2-bits). For outgoing replies the 
registers are: REG_REQ_OUT, REG_ACK_OUT, REG_RD_WR_L_OUT, 
REG_ADDR_OUT (23-bits), REG_DATA_OUT (32-bits), REG_SRC_OUT(2-
bits).[13] 
For request/reply REG_REQ_IN and REG_REQ_OUT are set to high for one clock 
cycle. Signals REG_RD_WR_L_IN and REG_RD_WR_L_OUT show the request/reply 
is read or write. For read it is high and for write it is low. Signals REG_ACK_IN 
and REG_ACK_OUT should be low for request and high for reply. “The 
REG_SRC_IN/OUT signals are used by register request initiators to identify the 
responses that are destined to the requestor. Each requestor should use a unique 
value as their source address.” [13] 
REG_ADDR_IN carries the right address of the module for which the request is 
made. The module looks for the address in this register. If it matches it performs 
the request. Once the request is finished, it places the processed data on 
REG_DATA_OUT and sets the REG_ACK_OUT. Rest output signals get all input 
values. All this is done in a single clock cycle. For the modules if REG_ADDR_IN 
doesn’t match it forwards all the inputs to the output registers set. [13] 
5.2 Packet Forwarding Operations 
The main functionality is implemented in module called 
output_port_selector, where the forwarding decision takes place and the 
packet is placed on the correct output queue.For computing the dynamic Link 
IDs, a separate module moustique is implemented for the stream cipher, and 
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aes_cipher_top for the block cipher. For each link, these modules are 
instantiated, in parallel with the output_port_selector module. The basic 
structure of output_port_selector is given in Figure 19.  
Prior to sending packets, the computed key K3 and the O2 value set are written 
into the NetFPGA registers from the user space. In our current implementation, 
the key K3 and the O2 values in the value set are both 256 bits each, as a result of 
HMAC-SHA-256 computed at the software side. One 32-bit port is used for 
writing these values into the registers. [27] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Packets arrive in 64-bit pieces at each clock cycle. From the input_arbiter 
module, packets are sent into the SRAM and to the output_port_selector 
module, for computing the dynamic link IDs and then taking the forwarding 
decision. Along-with the forwarding decision that takes place in the 
do_zfiltering logic block, the three parallelized operations take place for the 
packet goodness verification, i.e. bit_counter, ethertype, and TTL checks. [27] 
Register 
Interface 
Register 
access 
logic 
Header 
Counter 
Header 
state parser 
Moustique 
or AES 
bit counter 
ethertype 
TTL 
do_zFilterin
g 
Combine 
results 
Ctrl bus 
Data Bus 
Out ports 
New TTL 
Figure 19. output_port_selector module structure 
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For computing the dynamic Link IDs, two separate implementations were made, 
one for the Moustique stream cipher and the other for AES block cipher. Both of 
them are explained as follows. 
5.2.1 Moustique 
For Moustique, as the 96 bits of K3 register and 256 bits of O2 gets value from 
the user space, a control signal start_initialization is set to 1 and the 
initialization vector bits are applied at the cipher input for 105 clock cycles. The 
implementation then goes to a hold state, until a packet arrives. In the packet 
header, there comes the in-packet information (I). I is XORed with each value in 
the O2 value set (currently one for each port) and then applied to the cipher input 
of the Moustique module, with a control signal start_moustique set to 1. 
Moustique is instantiated four times, once for each outgoing port, for the 
NetFPGA in a parallel manner. [27] 
Our current Moustique implementation performs the ciphering in a single-bit 
fashion. Hence, the number of clock  cycles to perform whole ciphering depends 
upon k (see section 2.1.5). In our case, when k = 5 and m = 256, we need to 
perform only 40-bits of decryption, and hence it will take 40 clock cycles with 
the current implementation. With unrolling, we expect to get this down to maybe 
5 cycles, depending on the details of the propagation delays. As soon as the 
decrypted data is ready, decrypted_data_ready signal is set to 1 by moustique 
for one clock cycle, so that decrypted data can be read by 
output_port_selector. [27] 
5.2.2 AES 
In the block cipher case, AES, with the key and block sizes of 128, is used for the 
computation of F3. We used the OpenCores AES implementation.[24]  As the 
in-packet information I arrives, it is exclusive-ORed with the values in the O2 
value set. The data and the key K3 are loaded into the input of the cipher function, 
and start_AES is set to 1. [27] 
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The AES block cipher performs complete encryption sequence in 12 clock cycles, 
where the initial key expansion takes 1 clock cycle, 10 rounds take 10 clock 
cycles, and the output stage takes 1 clock cycle. [25] The clock timings are given 
in Figure 20.  
As the encryption is finished, decrypted_data_ready is set to 1 and the 
output_port_selector reads the encrypted data. 
 
Figure 20. AES cipher core timing [25] 
 
The Bloom mask is then computed for each outgoing link. As in our case m = 
256, each 8-bits of the decrypted data, from Moustique or AES, gives an index in 
Bloom mask where a 1 should be written. 
5.2.3 do-zfiltering 
In do-zfiltering, the actual matching is done for each outgoing link. For each 
interface we have a single bit forming a bit-vector. These bits are set to 1 initially. 
Matching is done for each Bloom mask and in-packet Bloom filter (iBF) using 
“AND” and comparison operations. If there is a mismatch for a particular link, 
the corresponding bit gets zero. At the end, when the matching is finished for 
each Bloom mask, the bit vector shows the interfaces to forward the packet. 
Wherever we have one in the bit vector, the packet is forwarded on that interface. 
But still we have some other checks from the three verification functions. [27] 
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5.2.4 bit_counter 
The bit_counter module counts number of ones in the iBF. This is done to 
avoid attacks of setting all bits to one in iBF. The maximum allowed number of 
ones in a iBF is a constant value. If the iBF contains more number of ones than 
the constant value, the packet gets dropped. This module is implemented using 
only wires and logic elements. It takes 64 bits input and returns number of ones. 
It means for 256 bits iBF it takes 4 clock cycles to count the number of ones. [27] 
5.2.5 Ethertype and TTL  
Currently, our iBF-based packets are identified using 0xacdc as the ethertype. 
This is checked upon the arrival of the packet. TTL is also checked to avoid loops 
in the network. As the packets are placed into the output-queues TTL is also 
decremented. [27] 
If any of the three verification checks or the iBF matching itself fails, the packet 
is dropped. All the operations are shown in reference to clock cycles in Figure 21 
and Figure 22, for Moustique and AES respectively. 
5.3 5.3 Management Software 
From the user space, the management software computes keys K1, K2 and K3 
using HMAC-SHA-256. Similarly, defining outgoing interfaces and then 
computing O1 and the O2 value sets using HMAC-SHA-256. It writes key K3 and 
O2 value set into the registers in NetFPGA card. At the software side it also 
computes zFormation i.e. F3 by using K3, O2 and generates nonce I for each 
packet. This is done for each interface and then iBF is computed and packed into 
the packet. [27] 
The software can send customizable packets to the NetFPGA card. It controls the 
delay between the transmitting packets, packets’ size, Time-to-live (TTL) in 
packet header, computing nonce I, defining iBF and ethernet protocol field. [27]
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Figure 21. Flow Diagram for Moustique [27] 
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Figure 22. Flow Diagram for AES [27]
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6  
EVALUATION 
 
In this chapter we will discuss several testing and verification results for the 
implementation. Two type of testing is given. One is regression tests and the other is 
simulation tests. The performance is also discussed on the basis of delay caused by 
each encryption technique for the computation of zFormation. This chapter also 
concludes the thesis.   
6.1 Regression Tests 
The regression tests verify the functionality of the hardware component of the 
zFormation. As there are two implementations. First, regression tests for Moustique 
and later the same steps for AES. In order to run the tests we need to connect the 
cables as described in each of the regression test below. All the procedure should be 
done while being root. The path and procedure for regression test is also defined at 
[26]. 
For these tests the bitfiles are downloaded into the NetFPGA and instructions can be 
found at [26][13]. In each of the regression tests some verification are done by 
sending pre-computed packets. These packets are sent using different ports and as per 
computation, expected to receive on particular ports and hence, verifying the correct 
implementation of the forwarding node. We have done testing for each and every 
interface individually to check the right implementation in the hardware. All these are 
defined in each of the regression test below. Each test checks for arrival of packets on 
port defined, ethertype check, TTL check and maximum number of 1s defined in the 
link IDs. Before sending the packets the values for O2 and K3 are also written into the 
registers of the NetFPGA using our management software. 
Test 1: Test for receiving packets on each port (Broadcast) 
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Connect interfaces eth1 and eth2 of a sending node to any of the ports from nf2c0 to 
nf2c3 on the NetFPGA. The shell script is used to send ten packets from interface 
eth1. The pre-computed packet information iBF for this test includes all the link 
indices M on the path while calculating O2. Hence, there should be a match for all the 
output queues and are received on all the ports on NetFPGA except the one from 
which it receives the packets. When packets are sent using interface eth1 they are 
received on eth2 and vice versa.  
As an output received for this test, 10 packets were received from interface eth2 when 
sent using interface eth1 and vice versa. 10 packets were sent with wrong ethertype 
and we didn’t receive any packet. For 10 packets, TTL was set to zero and again we 
didn’t receive any packets. To test the limitation of No. of 1’s in the iBF, 10 packets 
were sent with 1s
 
exceeding the limitation so that it may not forward the packets sent 
by an attacker just by writing all 1s. Although there would be a match with the Link 
ID but the check for 1s doesn’t allow the packets to get forward and we didn’t receive 
any packets for this check also..  
Hence, all the checks for ethertype, TTL, number of 1s limitation and broadcast 
passed.  
Test 2: Test for receiving packets only on port 2 (nf2c1)  
Connect interface eth2 to nf2c1 and eth1 to any other port. This test will send 10 
packets from interface eth1. The pre-computed packet information iBF for this test 
matches with only nf2c1 and eth2 receives the packets. Here, only the path for 
interface nf2c1 is added in O2. This test will fail if eth2 is connected to any other port.  
In the output, we received 10 packets only when the receiving interface eth2 was 
connected to nf2c1. All the three checks for ethertype, TTL and number of 1s 
exceeding limit were passed also. The test got failed when eth2 was connected to 
some other port than nf2c1. This verifies the right implementation of the zFormation. 
Test 3: Test for receiving packets only on port 3 (nf2c2)  
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Connect interface eth2 to nf2c2 and eth1 to any other port. This test will send 10 
packets from eth1. The pre-computed packet information iBF for this test matches 
with only nf2c2 and eth2 receives the packets. This test will fail if eth2 is connected to 
any other port.  
In the output, we received 10 packets only when the receiving interface eth2 was 
connected to interface nf2c2 on the NetFPGA. All the three checks for ethertype, TTL 
and number of 1s exceeding limit were passed also. The test got failed when eth2 was 
connected to some other port than nf2c2 since we didn’t receive any packets on other 
nodes as the packets were not supposed to get forward. 
Test 4: Test for receiving packets only on port 4 (nf2c3)  
Connect interface eth2 to nf2c3 and eth1 to any other port. This test will send 10 
packets from eth1. The pre-computed packet information iBF for this test matches 
with only nf2c3 and eth2 receives the packets. This test will fail if eth2 is connected to 
any other port.  
In the output, we received 10 packets only when the receiving interface eth2 was 
connected to interface nf2c3 on the NetFPGA. All the three checks for ethertype, TTL 
and number of 1s exceeding limit were passed also. The test got failed when eth2 was 
connected to some other port than nf2c3 since we didn’t receive any packets on other 
nodes as the packets were not supposed to get forward. 
Test 5: Test for receiving packets only on port 1 (nf2c0)  
Connect eth2 to nf2c0 and eth1 to any other port. This test will send 10 packets from 
eth1. The pre-computed packet information iBF for this test matches with only nf2c0 
and eth2 receives the packets. This test will fail if eth2 is connected to any other port.  
In the output, we received 10 packets only when the receiving interface eth2 was 
connected to interface nf2c0 on the NetFPGA. All the three checks for ethertype, TTL 
and number of 1s exceeding limit were passed also. The test got failed when eth2 was 
connected to some other port than nf2c0 since we didn’t receive any packets on other 
nodes as the packets were not supposed to get forward. 
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As we discussed the output of all the regression tests, that verifies the correct 
implementation of our forwarding node in the hardware. All the tests got passed as 
were supposed to perform for each included path and other mentioned checks.  
6.2 Tests for simulation  
There are 10 different tests for simulation verification. These are written using Perl 
script and can be found at [26]. The software tool they need is ModelSim for testing 
of Verilog code. Each script has the capability to generate packets with computing the 
in-packet information separately for each packet using the cryptographic technique it 
uses. It calculates the in-packet information dependent upon keys K1, K2 and K3 with 
O1, O2 and O3. It writes the required information that is K3 and O2 values into the 
registers in NetFPGA. Caculates the nonce I and F3, packs them into the packet's 
header and sends using different ports.  
First four tests are done to verify the broadcast functionality with verifying the 
packets are not received from the same port from where sent to avoid loops. 
Test 1: Sending packets using port 1 and expecting on all other ports  
Ten packets were sent using port 1 that is nf2c0. They are expected to arrive on all the 
other ports, except port 1 from which they are sent to avoid loops, as their paths are 
included when calculating the in-packet bloom filter (iBF).  
The simulation output verified the arrival of ten packets on each output port except 
port 1 from where the packets were sent. This output verifies the correct functionality 
of the implementation for broadcast.  
Test 2: Sending packets using port 2 and expecting on all other ports  
Ten packets were sent using port 2 that is nf2c1. They are expected to arrive on all the 
other ports, except port 2 from which they are sent to avoid loops, as their paths are 
included when calculating the in-packet bloom filter.  
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The simulation output verified the arrival of ten packets on each output port except 
port 1 from where the packets were sent. This output verifies the correct functionality 
of the implementation for broadcast.  
Test 3: Sending packets using port 3 and expecting on all other ports  
Ten packets are sent using port 3 that is nf2c2. They are expected to arrive on all the 
other ports except port 3, from which they are sent to avoid loops, as their paths are 
included when calculating the in-packet bloom filter.  
The output for this simulation showed arrival of ten packets on the ports except port 3 
proving test 3 passed.  
Test 4: Sending packets using port 4 and expecting on all other ports  
Ten packets are sent using port 4 that is nf2c3. They are expected to arrive on all the 
other ports, except port 4 from which they are sent to avoid loops, as their paths are 
included when calculating the in-packet bloom filter.  
The result for this test also got passed as all the ports received 10 packets each except 
port 4 where zero packets were received.  
Test 5: Sending packets using port 1 and port 2 is not included in the path  
Ten packets are sent using port 1 that is nf2c0. They are expected to arrive on all the 
other ports except the port 1 and port 2 because port1 is used to send the packets 
while port 2 is not included in the path while calculating iBF. Hence, there will be a 
mismatch at port 2. So no packets will arrive on port 1 and port 2.  
The output of the simulation also showed the same results of receiving ten packets on 
port 3 and port 4 each and zero packets on port 1 and port 2.  
Test 6: Sending packets using port 1 and port 3 is not included in the path  
Ten packets are sent using port 1 that is nf2c0. They are expected to arrive on all the 
other ports except the port 1 and port 3 because port1 is used to send the packets 
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while port 3 is not included in the path while calculating iBF. Hence, there will be a 
mismatch at port 3. So no packets will arrive on port 1 and port 3.  
The test also passed as ten packets were received on port 2 and port 4 and no packets 
were received on port 1 and port 3.  
 
Test 7: Sending packets using port 1 and port 4 is not included in the path  
Ten packets are sent using port 1 that is nf2c0. They are expected to arrive on all the 
other ports except the port 1 and port 4 because port1 is used to send the packets 
while port 4 is not included in the path while calculating iBF. Hence, there will be a 
mismatch at port 4. So no packets will arrive on port 1 and port 4. 
 The output of this simulation showed that this test also got passed by receiving ten 
packets on each port 2 and port 3 and no packets on port 1 and port 4.  
Test 8: Test for Ethertype  
Ten packets are sent using port 1 that is nf2c0. Ethertype is set different from 0xacdc. 
Hence, no packets should arrive on any of the ports.  
The output also verified the test by receiving zero packets on any of the ports. Hence, 
check for ethertype is working properly.  
Test 9: Test for TTL  
Ten packets are sent using port 1 that is nf2c0. TTL is set to 0. Hence, no packets 
should arrive on any of the ports.  
The output of this simulation test verified the functionality by not getting any packet 
on any port.  
Test 10: Test for different keys  
Ten packets are sent using port 1 that is nf2c0. Key K3 to calculate iBF is different 
from the key saved into the registers. There should be a mismatch and hence, no 
packets should arrive on any of the ports.  
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The output of this test verifies that the keys for particular flow for calculation of F3 
are working fine. If there is a mismatch in the secret key the traffic is not authorized 
and hence no forwarding takes place. Here, we didn’t receive any packets on any of 
the port.  
6.3 Performance 
The packet traversal times were measured in our test environment. Packets were sent 
at the rate of 25 packets/second. Sending and receiving operations were implemented 
in the FreeBSD kernel. Table 5 shows the measurement results with plain wire and 
one NetFGPA. The measurements were taken with Moustique, AES and then for 
LIPSIN [1] separately on the NetFPGA. The packet format “new” and “old” refer to 
packet header with in-packet information and without it. These formats can also be 
noticed from the flow diagrams for Moustique, AES, and LIPSIN in Figures 21, 22 
and 23 respectively. The readings were taken for 10 000 samples. [27] 
 
The delay caused by Moustique is 320ns (40 clock cycles for 40 bits) with k set to 5 
and m set to 256. The delay caused by AES is 96ns (12 clock cycles). After this, 
matching is performed only in a single clock cycle. These delays are quite small 
compared to the measured 3μs overall delay of the whole NetFPGA. The numbers 
presented in Table 6.1, the average delay for Moustique and AES measured agrees the 
expected results. As can be seen Moustique has average delay of 15,272ns and AES 
has 15,057ns. The measured difference between the two techniques is quite close to 
the expected results. [27] 
Figure 23. Flow diagram for LIPSIN [18] 
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Comparing Moustique and AES, with the increase in k and m set to 256, the bits to 
compute increase with a multiple of 8 in Moustique. Each bit requires 1 clock cycle 
and hence the clock cycles also increase in multiples of 8. For AES, upto 128 bits the 
clock cycles remain same that is 12. 128 bits mean that with AES k can be set to 16 
without any additional performance penalty. Hence, it became clear that the need for 
having the k bit indices before performing the zFilter comparison and the 64-bits 
nature of the NetFPGA data path make AES a faster choice. [27] 
In comparison to LIPSIN, although the delay time is greater for the computation of 
zFormation but it gives us more secure and dynamic way to compute the link IDs. 
 
Path and packet format Average Latency Standard deviation 
Wire (new) 12,784ns 4,448.96ns 
NetFPGA with Moustique (new) 15,272ns 4,991.28ns 
NetFPGA with AES (new) 15,057ns 3,756.86ns 
Wire (old) 12,549ns 4,867.34ns 
NetFPGA with LIPSIN 14,627ns 4,204.58ns 
 
Table 5. Latency measurement results [27] 
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7  
CONCLUSION 
 
In this thesis, we have described our early design and implementation for a source-
routing-based forwarding mechanism. Initial goal was to construct the mechanism 
that is dynamic and secure. Along with providing these functionalities, to measure the 
delays caused by the forwarding node in computation of secure methods in real 
hardware.  
The dynamic property was needed to avoid maintaining static tables to store the 
names of the outgoing links. Instead, forwarding node computes the forwarding link 
identifiers on the basis of some information from the packet, the link identifiers, and 
thereby the in-packet Bloom filters, may be made flow or packet contents dependent.  
To ensure security, the design described in chapter 4 takes care of resistance against 
forwarding-identifier-guessing attacks. In a forwarding fabric based on in-packet 
bloom filters, only authorized nodes are able to send packets; packets sent with 
guessed forwarding identifiers will be dropped with high probability.  
 We have briefly described two different implementations, one using the Moustique 
self-synchronizing stream cipher, and the other the AES block cipher function. Our 
initial assumption was to use self-synchronizing stream cipher because of their fast 
nature. For this, a single bit stream cipher Moustique was chosen. Contrary to our 
initial assumption that a stream cipher might be faster as it can efficiently produce a 
partial result, it turned out that the block-cipher-based implementation is faster in 
practice. The measurement results obtained from the hardware implementation in the 
NetFPGA proved AES to be a better choice. While unrolling the stream cipher might 
help to give more bits out on each cycle, also the block cipher can be unrolled. In any 
case, the results show the time taken by the cryptographic operations is negligible 
compared to the overall NetFPGA forwarding delay.  
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APPENDIX A 
 
Pseudocode for the SHA-256 algorithm follows.  
Note 1: All variables are unsigned 32 bits and wrap modulo 232 when calculating 
Note 2: All constants in this pseudo code are in big endian  
 
Initialize variables 
(first 32 bits of the fractional parts of the square roots of the first 8 primes 2..19): 
h[0..7] := 
   0x6a09e667, 0xbb67ae85, 0x3c6ef372, 0xa54ff53a, 0x510e527f, 
0x9b05688c, 0x1f83d9ab, 0x5be0cd19 
 
 
Initialize table of round constants 
(first 32 bits of the fractional parts of the cube roots of the first 64 primes 2..311): 
k[0..63] := 
   0x428a2f98, 0x71374491, 0xb5c0fbcf, 0xe9b5dba5, 0x3956c25b, 
0x59f111f1, 0x923f82a4, 0xab1c5ed5, 
   0xd807aa98, 0x12835b01, 0x243185be, 0x550c7dc3, 0x72be5d74, 
0x80deb1fe, 0x9bdc06a7, 0xc19bf174, 
   0xe49b69c1, 0xefbe4786, 0x0fc19dc6, 0x240ca1cc, 0x2de92c6f, 
0x4a7484aa, 0x5cb0a9dc, 0x76f988da, 
   0x983e5152, 0xa831c66d, 0xb00327c8, 0xbf597fc7, 0xc6e00bf3, 
0xd5a79147, 0x06ca6351, 0x14292967, 
   0x27b70a85, 0x2e1b2138, 0x4d2c6dfc, 0x53380d13, 0x650a7354, 
0x766a0abb, 0x81c2c92e, 0x92722c85, 
   0xa2bfe8a1, 0xa81a664b, 0xc24b8b70, 0xc76c51a3, 0xd192e819, 
0xd6990624, 0xf40e3585, 0x106aa070, 
   0x19a4c116, 0x1e376c08, 0x2748774c, 0x34b0bcb5, 0x391c0cb3, 
0x4ed8aa4a, 0x5b9cca4f, 0x682e6ff3, 
   0x748f82ee, 0x78a5636f, 0x84c87814, 0x8cc70208, 0x90befffa, 
0xa4506ceb, 0xbef9a3f7, 0xc67178f2 
 
Pre-processing: 
append the bit '1' to the message 
append k bits '0', where k is the minimum number >= 0 such that the 
resulting message 
    length (in bits) is congruent to 448 (mod 512) 
append length of message (before pre-processing), in bits, as 64-bit 
big-endian integer 
 
Process the message in successive 512-bit chunks: 
break message into 512-bit chunks 
for each chunk 
    break chunk into sixteen 32-bit big-endian words w[0..15] 
 
 
         Extend the sixteen 32-bit words into sixty-four 32-bit words: 
    for i from 16 to 63 
        s0 := (w[i-15] rightrotate 7) xor (w[i-15] rightrotate 18) 
xor (w[i-15] rightshift 3) 
56 
 
        s1 := (w[i-2] rightrotate 17) xor (w[i-2] rightrotate 19) xor 
(w[i-2] rightshift 10) 
        w[i] := w[i-16] + s0 + w[i-7] + s1 
        Initialize hash value for this chunk: 
    a := h0 
    b := h1 
    c := h2 
    d := h3 
    e := h4 
    f := h5 
    g := h6 
    h := h7 
 
        Main loop: 
    for i from 0 to 63 
        s0 := (a rightrotate 2) xor (a rightrotate 13) xor (a 
rightrotate 22) 
        maj := (a and b) xor (a and c) xor (b and c) 
        t2 := s0 + maj 
        s1 := (e rightrotate 6) xor (e rightrotate 11) xor (e 
rightrotate 25) 
        ch := (e and f) xor ((not e) and g) 
        t1 := h + s1 + ch + k[i] + w[i] 
        h := g 
        g := f 
        f := e 
        e := d + t1 
        d := c 
        c := b 
        b := a 
        a := t1 + t2 
 
         Add this chunk's hash to result so far: 
    h0 := h0 + a 
    h1 := h1 + b 
    h2 := h2 + c 
    h3 := h3 + d 
    h4 := h4 + e 
    h5 := h5 + f 
    h6 := h6 + g 
    h7 := h7 + h 
 
 
Produce the final hash value (big-endian): 
digest = hash = h0 append h1 append h2 append h3 append h4 append h5 
append h6 append h7 
 
